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Separation of Powers: Interpretation
Outside the Courts
Louis Fisher*
Law reviews carry hundreds of articles that examine with micro-
scopic precision the various judicial rulings on separation of powers.
The net result is a mixture of inconsistent and incoherent theories,
ranging from functional and pragmatic approaches to those that at-
tempt a doctrinaire and purist formulation. The conscientious (and
weary) reader of these rulings and articles is left with vague notions
of what the framers intended and what is legally required for con-
temporary times.
How does the federal government function in the face of this doc-
trinal confusion? The answer is that government does fairly well,
thank you, because most of the principal disputes involving separa-
tion of powers are resolved outside the courts. The majority of these
collisions never reach the courts or, if they do, are quickly pushed
back to the executive and legislative branches for nonjudicial treat-
ment. These accommodations and informal agreements are crucial in
understanding separation of powers, but law reviews provide scant
attention on the ground that the resolutions are "political" rather
than "constitutional" interpretations. In fact, they are both, and the
student of separation of powers should be sensitive to the complex
and delicate arrangements that are fashioned regularly outside the
courtroom.
I. SEPARATION DOCTRINES BY THE SUPREME COURT
Under the best of conditions, the Supreme Court offers limited
help in resolving the basic disputes of separation of power. There are
simply too many conflicts over issues that are not easily addressed in
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court. Moreover, during the last two decades the Court has slipped
back and forth in its search for principles, sometimes embracing a
functional and pragmatic approach and switching later to a doctri-
naire, formalistic model. With this confusion, the executive and leg-
islative branches operate under unusual pressure to fend for
themselves.
The functional approach was used by the Supreme Court in 1974
when it rejected President Nixon's claim of an absolute power to de-
termine the limits of executive privilege.1 Instead, the Court empha-
sized checks and balances and the need for "a workable
government."2 Separation of powers entered the Court's equation
only in the sense of preserving "the essential functions of each
branch."3 There was no effort to establish rigid boundaries and disal-
low the slightest intrusion.4
Three years later, in another case involving Nixon's papers, the
Court again viewed separation of powers in practical terms.5 It re-
jected the rigid view of the Court in 1935 that the three branches of
government "[must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive
influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others" 6 and endorsed
the "more pragmatic, flexible approach" of James Madison and Jus-
tice Story.7 The Court limited itself to an inquiry into "the extent to
which [a] statute prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions . .. [and] whether that impact
is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress."8 Through this analysis the
Court permitted some sharing and overlapping of power.
However, in a series of rulings from 1982 to 1986, the Court ad-
vanced a doctrinal notion of separated powers. In 1982, it upheld an
absolute immunity for the President in civil cases, treating immunity
as "a functionally' mandated incident of the President's unique office,
rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers'and
supported by our history."9 The Court expressed concern about the
"dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
Branch."'10 Thus the Court prohibited any overlapping and instead
selected a fixed boundary.
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2. Id. at 707.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 707-13.
5. See Nixon v. Administration of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
6. Id. at 441-42 (quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935)).
7. Id. at 442.
8. Id. at 443.
9. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
10. Id. at 754.
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The Court's concern for intrusion appears in another decision in
1982, in which it struck down a statute permitting bankruptcy judges
to exercise judicial powers without the protections of life tenure and
irreducible salaries guaranteed to Article III judges." The plurality
opinion reasoned that the effort of Congress to establish bankruptcy
courts under Article I "threatens to supplant completely our system
of adjudication in independent Art. III tribunals and replace it with a
system of 'specialized' legislative courts."12 The Court seemed to go
out of its way to present a worst-case scenario of one branch invading
another. However, nothing in the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Act suggested that Congress was positioning itself to take over
the federal judiciary.
The Court continued to endorse a highly formalistic model of sepa-
rated powers in INS v. Chadha.13 In striking down the legislative
veto, the Court dismissed as irrelevant the utility of this instrument
for settling executive-legislative disagreements: "Convenience and ef-
ficiency are not the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of dem-
ocratic government . "... 14 The Court cited the framers' fear of
despotism and the possibility of encroachments by one branch on an-
other.15 Although the Court denied that the branches, are "hermeti-
cally" sealed from one another, it insisted that the Constitution
divided government into "three defined categories, Legislative, Exec-
utive, and Judicial," and that it was a duty of the Court to resist the
"hydraulic pressures inherent within each of the separate Branches
to exceed the outer limits of its power."16
It was simplistic to describe the legislative veto as a device merely
by which Congress hoped to dominate the executive branch. The his-
tory of the legislative veto clearly demonstrates that it originated as a
desire by the executive branch to exercise a greater share of the leg-
islative power. 17 The framers did not object to a sharing or partial
intermixture of powers. They were not doctrinaire advocates of a
pure separation between branches. They knew that the "danger of
tyranny or injustice lurks in unchecked power, not in blended
11. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
12. Id. at 73.
13. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
.14. Id. at 944.
15. Id. at 946-51.
16. Id. at 951.
17. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CoNFLIcTs BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PREsi.
DENT 164-66 (1985).
power."l 8
When the Supreme Court announces unrealistic and impractical
concepts of separated powers, its decisions may be largely ignored or
circumvented. That is what happened with the legislative veto. De-
spite the Court's rulings in Chadha, Congress continues to put legisla-
tive vetoes in bills and Presidents continue to sign those bills into
law. The number of legislative vetoes enacted into law after Chadha
is approximately two hundred, generally vesting congressional con-
trol in its committees and subcommittees.19
The Court persisted with doctrinaire formulations in Bowsher v.
Synar.20 In rejecting the assignment in the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Act of executive duties to the Comptroller General because he
is subject to removal by a joint resolution of Congress, the Court
claimed that the framers provided for "a separate and wholly in-
dependent Executive Branch."2 ' "Subject only to impeachment pro-
ceedings," the Court argued that the President was "responsible not
to the Congress but to the people." 22 Anyone who follows govern-
ment knows that the President is very much responsible to Congress.
That responsiveness results from a number of congressional powers
and practical realities that have nothing to do with impeachment or
the threat of impeachment.
Nevertheless, the Court pushed ahead with its doctrine by agreeing
with language in a 1935 decision that enshrined separation of powers
at the cost of checks and balances: "The fundamental necessity of
maintaining each of the three general departments of government
entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to
serious question."23 That dictum is fantastic for many reasons, but
one will do. Obviously Congress was not "entirely free" from the
control or coercive influence of the Court when it declared the legis-
lative veto and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act unconstitutional.
As a final gesture to the cause of pure separation, the Court an-
nounced that "once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation,
its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution
of its enactment only indirectly - by passing new legislation." 24 No
one reading newspapers for a week could believe that. The Court it-
self has acknowledged the power of Congress to investigate, issue
18. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 54 (1960).
19. See ivkfra Section III.E.
20. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
21. Id. at 722.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 725 (quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935)).
24. Id. at 733-34. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983).
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subpoenas, and hold executive officials in contempt.25 Continued
participation by Congress does not require the passage of public laws.
Oddly, on the same day that the Court released this unrealistic
opinion, it resorted to pragmatism in upholding the power of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to handle state law coun-
terclaims in reparations proceedings before the agency.26 Litigants
had argued that executive agencies could not adjudicate, but the
Court turned aside this demand for crisp boundaries between the
branches. In determining the extent to which a given congressional
decision to authorize adjudication (by executive agencies) "impermis-
sibly threatens the institutional integrity of the judicial branch, the
Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules".27 The
Court weighed a number of factors "with an eye to the practical ef-
fect" that congressional actions have on the judiciary.28
A few years later the Court jettisoned the rigid doctrines of
Chadha and Bowsher. In 1988, the Court upheld the power of Con-
gress to authorize federal judges to appoint an independent counsel
to prosecute high-ranking officials in the executive branch.29
Whereas in the bankruptcy court case the Court seemed alarmed
about the slightest congressional interference of the judicial power,
in Morrison v. Olson it upheld the decision of Congress to permit the
Attorney General to remove the independent counsel only for "good
cause." 30 The Court concluded that the good cause standard did not
"unduly trammel" executive authority.31 The President's need to
control the independent counsel was not "so central to the function-
ing of the Executive Branch" to require that the independent counsel
serve at the pleasure of the President.32 Furthermore, the Court
stated that "we have never held that the Constitution requires that
the three Branches of Government 'operate with absolute
25. The congressional power to investigate is implied in the power to legislate
wisely. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). Congress has the power to issue
subpoenas. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975).
Congress also has the power to punish contempt. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 228. (1821).
26. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
27. Id. at 851 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 590 (1985)).
28. Id.
29. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
30. Id. at 692.
31. Id. at 691.
32. Id.
independence.' "33
A year later, the Court again embraced a pragmatic, functional at-
titude toward separation of powers, noting that "the Framers did not
require - and indeed rejected - the notion that the three Branches
must be entirely separate and distinct."34 Madison, the Court noted,
recognized that the Constitution imposed upon the branches "a de-
gree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well
as independence."35 The Court explicitly adopted a "flexible under-
standing of separation of powers."30
Given the Court's failure to develop a consistent and coherent the-
ory of separated powers, and its record of avoiding many of the dis-
putes between Congress and the President, it is not surprising that
the meaning of separation of powers is developed for the most part
outside the courts. The actual substance of various clauses and provi-
sions in the Constitution are the result of compromises and accom-
modations reached between legislators and executive officials.
II. THE THEORY OF COORDINATE CONSTRUCTION
The authority of Congress and the executive branch to engage in
"coordinate construction" by resolving constitutional issues, espe-
cially those involving separation of powers, is reflected in the debate
in 1789 on the President's power to remove executive officials. Some
members of the First Congress thought that the Senate should have a
role in removals because it participates in appointments. At the end
of this lengthy and informed debate, however, Congress decided to
recognize the President's power to remove departmental heads, even
though such power is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution.37
When legislators said it was improper for Congress to resolve the
issue by statute instead of submitting it to the courts, Madison denied
that it was necessary to defer to the judiciary on this constitutional
question. He dismissed the argument that "it would be officious in
this branch of the Legislature to expound the Constitution, so far as
it relates to the division of power between the President and the
Senate."38
Madison told his colleagues that it was "incontrovertibly of as much impor-
tance to this branch of the Government as to any other, that the Constitution
should be preserved entire. It is our duty, so far as it depends upon us, to take
care that the powers of the Constitution be preserved entire to every depart-
33. Id. at 693-94 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 693, 707 (1974)).
34. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
35. Id. at 381.
36. Id.
37. L. FISHER, sUpra note 17, at 61-66.
38. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
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ment of Government .... ,,39
The "Father of the Constitution" harbored no doubts about the au-
thority and competence of Congress to decide the constitutional
question:
But the great objection drawn from the source to which the last arguments
would lead us is, that the Legislature itself has no right to expound the Con-
stitution; that wherever its meaning is doubtful, you must leave it to take its
course, until the Judiciary is called upon to declare its meaning. I acknowl-
edge, in the ordinary course of Government, that the exposition of the laws
and Constitution devolves upon the Judiciary. But I beg to know, upon what
principle it can be contended, that any one department draws from the Con-
stitution greater powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers
of the several departments? The Constitution is the charter of the people to
the Government; it specifies certain great powers as absolutely granted, and
marks out the departments to exercise them. If the Constitutional boundary
of either be brought into question, I do not see that any one of these in-
dependent departments has more right than another to declare their senti-
ments on that point.4 0
Just as the Constitution omits the President's power of removal, so
is it silent on the power of Congress to investigate the executive
branch.- When the House of Representatives in 1792 learned that the
troops of Major General St. Clair had suffered heavy losses during an
Indian attack, it first considered a resolution to request the President
to institute an inquiry. That resolution was defeated 35 to 21.41 The
House then passed a resolution to empower a committee to inquire
into the causes of the military failure, and "to call for such persons,
papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries." 42
According to the account of Thomas Jefferson, at that time serving as
Secretary of State, President Washington convened his Cabinet to
consider the extent to which the House could call for papers. The
Cabinet debated the issue and agreed:
First, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might institute inquiries.
Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third, that the Executive
ought to communicate such papers as the public good would permit, and ought
to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the public: consequently
were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the committee nor House
had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who and whose papers were
under the President alone; but that the committee should instruct their chair-
man to move the House to address the President.4 3
The Cabinet concluded that there was not a paper "which might
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490-93 (1792).
42. Id. at 493.
43. 1 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 304 (Memorial ed. 1903)..
not be properly produced."44 The committee examined papers fur-
nished by the executive branch, papers and accounts furnished by the
Treasury and the War departments, and listened to explanations
from the heads of those Departments and from other witnesses.
General St. Clair supplied the committee with written remarks on
the expedition.45 The Cabinet's advice that the House could call on
the heads of departments only through the President was an artificial
formality, long since abandoned.
Congress exercised the investigative power on many occasions after
1792, but it was not until 1927 that the Supreme Court acknowledged
the constitutional power of Congress to investigate activities in the
executive branch.46 The Court had no alternative. It could not at
that time, or even earlier, deny that such power existed. It could
merely give its blessing to a power already recognized as' legitimate
by Congress and the President.
Another early illustration of coordinate construction was the dis-
pute over the power of Congress to create the Bank of the United
States. Congress created the Bank in 1791, but voted against it in
1811 and 1815. It revived the Bank in 1816 and, in 1819, the Supreme
Court upheld its constitutionality in McCulloch v. Maryland.47 When
Congress chose to recharter the Bank in 1832, many considered the
constitutional dispute closed. However, President Andrew Jackson
read his constitutional powers differently by insisting that nothing
done by previous Congresses, Presidents, or Court decisions could re-
strict, in any way, his personal judgment of constitutionality. In veto-
ing the bill, he gave these reasons:
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it
ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this Government. The Con-
gress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own
opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support
the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as
it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representa-
tives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality
of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or ap-
proval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for
judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Con-
gress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the
President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must
not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when
acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the
force of their reasoning may deserve. 4 8
Jackson's final remark resembles an observation by Chief Justice
Taney. In a dissenting opinion in 1849, he said that the Court's opin-
44. Id. at 305.
45. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. at 1106.
46. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-75 (1927).
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819).
48. 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1145 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
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ion "upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to dis-
cussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that
its judicial. authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force
of the reasoning by which it is supported."49
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS DISPUTES
This section examines a number of constitutional questions on sep-
aration of powers that are largely, if not exclusively, decided by Con-
gress and the President. The courts enter some of these discussions,
but often as the junior partner. The specific disputes analyzed in this
section include the veto power, the pocket veto, recess appointments,
the incompatibility and ineligibility clauses, the legislative veto, war
power and covert operations.
A. The Veto Power
The President's power to exercise the veto precipitated a number
of constitutional clashes between the executive and legislative
branches. Some of those issues have been resolved by the courts, but
the disputes are addressed first by the political branches and largely
resolved there.
For example, the Constitution states that if the President vetoes a
bill he must return it "with his Objections to the House in which it
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it."50 Must Congress immediately
"proceed" to reconsider a veto? That was the practice under the
early Presidents when vetoes were rare. President Washington exer-
cised the first veto on April 5, 1792. The House of Representatives
resolved that the bill be reconsidered the next day.51 The House sus-
tained the veto on April 6, 1792.52 Washington's second veto, on Feb-
ruary 28, 1797, was sustained a day later, on March 1.53
There were no vetoes by Presidents John Adams or Thomas Jef-
ferson. When President Madison vetoed a bill on February 21, 1811,
members of the House of Representatives debated at great length
over the propriety of referring the veto message to a select commit-
tee. Some believed that the Constitution required immediate recon-
49. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting).
50. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
51. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 539 (1792).
52. Id. at 541.
53. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2326-32 (1797).
sideration.54 Others insisted that each house had a right to refer a
vetoed bill to a select committee for closer study.55 The override ef-
fort took place two days later, with the House sustaining the veto.56
Madison's second veto occurred on February 28, 1811. The House
agreed to reconsider the bill the following day, but no action was
taken and no one questioned the right of the House to postpone a
scheduled reconsideration.57 The House sustained the veto on March
2.58 Madison's third veto came on Friday, April 3, 1812. The House
of Representatives ordered that reconsideration occur "tomorrow."59
Later in the day, the House considered an issue that required secrecy
and the clearing of the galleries. Secret deliberations continued on
Saturday, April 4, with no action on the vetoed bill. Reconsideration
did not occur until Wednesday,. April 8, when the override effort
failed.60
President Jackson's fourth regular veto set the precedent for no ac-
tion at all by Congress: the veto was unchallenged. The Senate con-
sidered the constitutional requirement of "proceed to reconsider"
satisfied by laying a veto message on the table without moving to
either a debate or a vote.61 Jackson's last regular veto was sent to
the Senate on Friday, June 10, 1836, and the unsuccessful effort to
override it did not occur until fourteen days later (Sundays
excluded).62
On August 10, 1842, the House adopted a resolution to refer one of
President Tyler's veto messages to a select committee for review.
Although objections were raised that the delay violated the constitu-
tional command to reconsider a bill, the resolution passed and the
override vote occurred after the committee issued its report.63
Greater delays developed with subsequent vetoes. President Pierce
vetoed a bill on May 3, 1854, and the override vote did not occur until
tmore than two months later on July 6, 1854.64 Congress took more
than two months to schedule an override of President Pierce's veto
of May 19, 1856.65 The Senate overrode the veto on July 7, 1856, and
the House overrode the veto a day later.66 No recess or adjournment
interrupted this period.
54. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 984 (1811) (statement of Mr. Smilie).
55. Id. (statements of Mr. Bassett and Mr. Pitkin).
56. Id. at 997-98.
57. Id. at 1097-98, 1101.
58. Id. at 1103-05.
59. 24 ANNALS OF CONG. 1252 (1812).
60. Id. at 1277-78.
61. CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., lst-2d Sess. 326 (1835).
62. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 435, 469 (1836).
63. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 873-75, 877, 882-83, 894-902 (1842).
64. PRESIDENTIAL VETOS, 1789-1976 22 (1978).
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id.
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On January 11, 1870, President Grant vetoed a private relief bill.67
The Senate overrode the veto on May 31, 1870, a delay of more than
four and a half months, while the House sustained the veto on June
22, 1870. Both Houses were in session throughout that period. Today
it is established that if the President vetoes a bill, Congress may
schedule an override vote at any time during the two years of a Con-
gress. This constitutional question has been left to the rules and pro-
cedures of the two houses of Congress.
What is meant by "two thirds of that House" for an override vote?
Does it mean two-thirds of the total membership of each' House, or
merely two-thirds of a majority present? The House of Repiesenta-
tives early decided that the requirement was two-thirds of the mem-
bers present, provided they formed a quorum.68 That ruling was
liberalized in 1912 when Speaker of the House Clark announced that
an override required two-thirds of the members present and voting.6 9
The dispute involved an override attempt in" which there were 174
yeas and 80 nays, with ten voting present. Although the 174 fell
short of two-thirds of the 264 present, it did constitute two-thirds of
the 254 voting. The override therefore carried.70
In 1919, the Supreme Court referred to these precedents estab-
lished by Congress and decided that two-thirds of a quorum sufficed
for an override.71 Two-thirds of "that House" meant a House organ-
ized and entitled to exert legislative power (a quorum).72 The prac-
tice of Congress has been to accept two-thirds of the members
present and voting.
Another veto issue largely resolved outside the courts involves the
question of whether a President can sign a bill after Congress has re-
cessed. The theory was that presidential approval of a bill was not
strictly an executive function. Instead, the function was legislative in
nature and must occur only when both houses were actually sitting.
The Court in 1899 refused to accept that construction, reasoning that
if a President decides to sign a bill, no further action by Congress is
required, thus eliminating the need for Congress to be in session.7 3
That decision of the court triggered a related issue: may a Presi-
67. Id. at 37.
68. 4 A. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS § 3537-38 n.2 (1907).
69. 7 C. CANNON, CANNON'S PRECEDENTS § 1111 (1935).
70. Id.
71. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 280-81 (1919).
72. Id.
73. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453-54 (1899).
dent sign a bill after the final adjournment of a Congress? For much
of our history, Presidents believed that they were a constituent part
of Congress with respect to the lawmaking process and therefore
could sign legislation only while Congress remained in session. Con-
sistent with that belief, Presidents would come to a special room in
the Capitol and sign hundreds of bills in the final days of a Congress.
President Cleveland challenged that practice and refused to go to the
Capitol, but relented a year later upon the advice of his Attorney
General.74 In 1920 and again in 1931, two Attorneys General argued
that the President had constitutional authority to sign a bill after the
final adjournment of Congress.75 In 1932, the Supreme Court agreed
with that assessment. 76
B. The Pocket Veto
The Constitution provides that any bill returned by the President
"within ten Days (Sundays excepted)" shall become law "unless the
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it
shall not be a Law."77 Other than an adjournment at the end of a
Congress, what other adjournments "prevent" the return of a bill to
Congress? The Supreme Court has provided two guidelines. In 1929,
it held that a five-month adjournment at the end of a first session
prevented a bill's return and justified the President's pocket veto.78
A decade later, the Court decided that a recess by the Senate for
three days was so short that the Senate could act with "reasonable
promptitude" on a return veto.79 As a way of underscoring the fact
that the President was not prevented from returning a bill, the Sen-
ate authorized the Secretary of the Senate to receive bills during the
recess.80
Other judicial guidance has come from the lower courts. During a
Christmas adjournment in 1970, the Senate was absent for four days
and the House for five. Despite the brief interval and the Senate's
designation of an officer to receive messages from the President,
President Nixon pocket-vetoed a bill. Unlike the 1929 action, Nixon's
action involved a short adjournment during a session rather than a
lengthy adjournment at the end of a session. A district court held
that the adjournment had not prevented Nixon from returning the
74. Renick, The Power of the President to Sign Bills After the Adjournment of
Congress, 32 Am. U.L. REv. 208 (1898).
75. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 225 (1920); 36 Op. Att'y Gen. 403, 406 (1931).
76. Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
78. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
79. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 590 (1938).
80. Id. at 589-90.
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bill to Congress as a regular veto.8 ' When that decision was upheld
a year later by an appellate court, it appeared that pocket vetoes
during any intrasession adjournment, no matter how long, would
be unconstitutional, provided that Congress made appropriate ar-
rangements for the receipt of presidential messages during the
adjournment.8 2
The Nixon administration decided that it would not appeal this de-
cision to the Supreme Court.83 Under the pressure of a possibly ad-
verse decision from the courts, the Ford administration agreed to a
political accommodation. It was announced that the pocket veto
would not be used during a session.s4 When Senator Edward Ken-
nedy renewed the issue in court, the Ford administration agreed in
1976 that it would eliminate the pocket veto during both intrasession
and intersession adjournments.8 5 Thus, the pocket veto would be
available only at the end of a Congress.
President Carter honored the accommodation reached during the
Ford administration. However, President Reagan provoked another
court test by using the pocket veto between the first and second ses-
sions. A district judge upheld his action,86 but that decision was over-
turned by an appellate court because the House and the Senate had
designated an agent to receive veto messages from the President.8 7
According to the appellate court, "it is difficult to understand how
Congress could be said to have prevented return of H.R. 4042 simply
by adjourning. Rather, by appointing agents for receipt of veto
messages, Congress affirmatively facilitated return of the bill in the
eventuality that the President would disapprove it."88
With this case headed to the Supreme Court, it appeared that the
constitutional issue over the pocket veto would finally be settled.
However, in 1987 the Court held that the dispute between Congress
and President Reagan was moot because the bill had expired by its
81. Kennedy v. Sampson, 364 F. Supp. 1075, 1086-87 (D.D.C. 1973), ff 'd, 511 F.2d
430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
82. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
83. Keeffe & Jorgenson, Solicitor General Pocket Vetoes the Pocket Veto, 61
A.B.A.J. 755 (1975).
84. 121 CONG. REC. 41,884 (1975) (statement of Representative Rhodes).
85. 122 CONG. REc. 11,202 (1976); Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C.
1976).
86. Barnes v. Carmen, 582 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd sub nom Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
87. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
88. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
own terms.8 9 The Court might have used the mootness argument to
duck an even more troublesome issue: whether members of Congress
have standing to sue in court.9
In any event, the mootness claim tossed the issue back to the two
political branches for possible resolution. In 1990, the House Rules
Committee reported legislation to restrict the pocket veto to the end
of a Congress (adjournment sine die).91 The bill was referred to the
House Judiciary Committee, which also reported the bill favorably.92
The House did not act on the reported bill during the 101st Congress.
C. Recess Appointments
Congressional recesses and adjournments invite another separation
of power dispute: the power of the President to make recess appoint-
ments. The framers realized that the Senate would not always be in
session to give its advice and consent to presidential nominations. To
cover those periods of absence, the President "shall have Power to
fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Sen-
ate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session."93 A determination by the President to exploit this
power to the fullest would undermine the Senate's constitutional
power over confirmations.
The reach of the power to make recess appointments has been de-
fined primarily by the legislative and executive branches. An early
issue involved the meaning of "happen." Does that mean only the va-
cancies that "happen to take place" during a recess, or any vacancy
that may "happen to exist" at the time of a recess? A long list of
opinions by Attorneys General favors the latter, and broader, inter-
pretation.94 These opinions opened the door to substantial leeway for
the President, requiring Congress to intervene with statutory
restrictions.
In a report issued in 1863, the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected
the opinions of Attorneys General that a recess appointee can fill a
vacancy that occurs during a session. Interpreting the constitutional
language "may happen during the Recess of the Senate" to include
89. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987).
90. Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. H.R. REP. No. 417, pt. 1 101st Cong., 2d Sess., (1990).
92. H.R. REP. No. 417, pt. 2 101st Cong., 2d Sess., (1990).
93. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
94. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631 (1823); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 525 (1832); 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 523
(1846); 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 356 (1862); 12 Op. Att'y. Gen. 32, 38 (1866); 12 Op. Att'y Gen.
455, 457 (1868); 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 522, 524 (1880); 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1884); 19 Op.
Att'y Gen. 261, 262 (1889); 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 314, 315 (1914); 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 20, 23
(1921); 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 465-66 (1960). See also In Re Farrow, 3 F. 112, 113-15
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880) (concurring with the Attorneys' General opinions from 1823 to
1880).
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what happened before the recess seemed to the committee "a perver-
sion of language."95 Such reasoning tilted the balance of power to-
ward the President and placed inordinate weight on the need to fill a
vacancy, all at the cost of excluding the Senate. Unless Congress
placed some constraint on the power to make recess appointments,
an "ambitious, corrupt, or tyrannical executive" could nullify the
Senate's constitutional role.96
To protect the prerogatives of the Senate, Congress decided to in-
voke its power of the purse. Legislation enacted in 1863 prohibited
the use of funds to pay the salary of anyone appointed during a Sen-
ate recess to fill a vacancy that existed "while the Senate was in ses-
sion and is by law required to be filled by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, until such appointee shall have been con-
firmed by the Senate."97 Subsequent opinions by Attorneys General
recognized the restrictive effect of this statute.98 In fact, the statute
was far too rigid. An officer covered by this statute would have to
serve without pay (relying on, savings and loans) until the Senate
consented to the nomination. At times, Congress had to pass a spe-
cial statute to compensate people who served for long periods as a re-
cess appointee and were not entitled to a salary.99
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported legislation in
1939 to eliminate some of the harsh effects of the existing law on re-
cess appointments. Three exceptions would be allowed, permitting
payment of salaries, (1) if the vacancy arose within thirty days prior
to a Senate adjournment; (2) if, at the time of adjournment, a nomi-
nation was pending before the Senate. (other than a nomination for
someone appointed during the preceding recess of the Senate); and
(3) if a nomination was rejected by the Senate within thirty days
prior to an adjournment and a person (other than the one rejected)
receives a recess commission.' o The Committee's report also recom-
mended that a nomination to fill a vacancy under the three excep-
tions should be submitted to the Senate not later than forty days
after the next succe ding session of the senate.' 0 1 The Justice De-
95. S. REP. No. 80, 37th Cong., 3d Seass. 5 (1863).
96. Id. at 6.
97. Act of Feb. 9, 1863, ch. 25, 82, 12 Stat. 642, 646.
98. 16 Op. Att'y Gen. 522, 531 (1880); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 234, 235-36 (1907); 32 OP.
Att'y Gen. 271, 272 (1920); 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 463,,473-74 (1960).
99. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 272, 39 Stat. 801.
100. S. REP. No. 1079, 76th Cong., 1st Seass. 1 (1939).
101. Id. at 2.
partment supported the legislation.1o2 Almost a year later, the House
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments reported
the bill without amendment and recommended its passage.10 3 The
bill was enacted in 1940.104
The constitutionality of this provision has never been tested in the
courts. In dicta in a 1979 decision, a federal judge remarked: "It
might be noted that if any and all restrictions on the President's re-
cess appointment power, however limited, are prohibited by the Con-
stitution, 5 U.S.C. § 5503 ... might also be invalid. That question,
however, is not before the court in this case."' 0 5
The current law on recess appointments is not self-executing, as is
the case with many other statutes. Moments before a recess, the
President could submit a name, even after allowing the position to
remain empty for months, and still be covered by the second excep-
tion. For instance, President Carter allowed over six months to go by
following a vacancy in the office of the OMB Deputy Director on
March 24, 1978 before forwarding the name of John White on Octo-
ber 7. Thus, reappointment was "pending" when the Senate ad-
journed. Carter then resubmitted the name within the forty day
time limit following the recess, which avoided Senate "interference"
with the appointment. Carter violated the spirit of the statutory re-
quirement for confirmation yet, legally, complied with the strict let-
ter of the law. The Senate did not give its advice and consent until
April 10, 1979.106
There is no specific agreement between Congress and the Presi-
dent on the precise number of days of adjournment that would trig-
ger the President's recess appointment power. The general rule of
the Justice Department is that a temporary recess of the Senate,
"protracted enough to prevent that body from performing its func-
tions of advising and consenting to executive nominations," permits
the President to make recess appointments. 0 7 The Senate's adjourn-
ment from July 3 to August 8, 1960, constituted a "Recess of the Sen-
ate" as interpreted by the Justice Department.108 On the other hand,
short adjournments "for 5 or even 10 days" do not constitute the re-
cess intended by the Constitution, according to another Attorney
General opinion. 0 9
102. Id. at 2-3.
103. H.R. REP. No. 2646, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940).
104. Act of July 11, 1940, Pub. L. No. 738, § 1761, 54 Stat. 751, (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 5503 (1988)).
105. Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 596 n.24 (D.D.C. 1979).
106. L. FISHER, supra note 17, at 51.
107. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 463, 466 (1960).
108. Id.
109. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 20, 25 (1921). See also 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 311, 315
(1979).
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These guidelines have not resolved specific disputes, where the in-
strument for settlement is not careful parsing of constitutional provi-
sions but the exercise of political muscle. In 1984, President Reagan
angered the Senate by giving a recess appointment to Martha Seger,
placing her on the Federal Reserve Board a few days after Congress
began a three-week recess. The Senate Banking Committee had ap-
proved her nomination narrowly, 10-8, and anticipated a close vote on
the floor. That prospect vanished because of Reagan's action. The
Senate Majority Leader, Robert C. Byrd, introduced a Senate resolu-
tion stating that it was the sense of the Senate that the power to
make recess appointments should be confined to a formal termina-
tion of a session of the Senate or where the Senate will be in recess
for longer than thirty days.i1o The resolution, which was never put
to a vote, would not have been legally binding. However, it sent a
very strong message to the executive branch that it had overstepped
its recess appointment power.
A year later, the Senate passed another resolution expressing the
sense of the Senate that recess appointments should not be made to
the Federal Reserve Board except under unusual circumstances and
only for the purpose of fulfilling "a demonstrable and urgent need"
in the administration of the Board's activities."' When President
Reagan continued to make liberal use of his recess appointment au-
thority, Senator Byrd retaliated late in 1985 by convincing fellow
Democrats to delay any further action on virtually all presidential
nominations.112 Such confrontations forced a new distribution of
power, now requiring the executive branch to limit its reliance on re-
cess appointments if it wants legislative support for other
nominations.
The use of recess appointments to place men and women on the
federal courts is especially sensitive, for these individuals remain on
the bench for a year or more and must face confirmation after their
recess appointment ends. In the 1950s, after President Eisenhower
placed Earl Warren, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Potter Stewart on
the Supreme Court as recess appointees, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee prepared a report that was highly critical of this practice and
110. 130 CONG. REC. 23,234-36, 23,341 (1984).
111. 131 CONG. REC. 17,622-24 (1985).
112. Recess Appointments Raise Senators'Anger, Democrats Delay Nominations in
Protest, Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 1985, at A23; PUB. PAPERS 1985 (II), at 1209 (1985);
Whitehouse Asks End to Appointee "Backlog, ", Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1985, at A17.
the damage it inflicts on the independence of the courts.11 3
In 1960, the Senate passed a resolution that challenged this prac-
tice. The Senate did not want to confirm a recess appointee who had
already sat on the bench and issued decisions. Should Senators take
into account those decisions? Would a judge issue decisions with an
eye toward the President's later nomination, confirmation hearings,
and Senate vote? Were litigants given short change in court by
pleading their case before an unconfirmed judge? The Senate resolu-
tion, which passed 48 to 37 along party lines, first detailed the disad-
vantages of making recess appointments to the Supreme Court and
then provided:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the making of recess appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court of the United States may not be wholly consis-
tent with the best interests of the Supreme Court, the nominee who may be
involved, the litigants before the Court, nor indeed the people of the United
States, and that such appointments, therefore, should not be made except
under unusual circumstances and for the purpose of preventing or ending a
demonstrable breakdown in the administration of the Court's business. 1 14
Although legally nonbinding, no President since Eisenhower has
made a recess appointment to the Supreme Court. The power exists,
technically, but a President who defied the resolution would risk
having the nominee, after serving as a federal judge, rejected deci-
sively by the Senate in order to protect its institutional prerogatives.
The President's authority to make recess appointments to the fed-
eral courts was upheld by the Second Circuit in 1962,115 and again in
1985 by the Ninth Circuit. 118 The latter case involved a recess ap-
pointment by President Carter to a district court. The fact that the
federal courts have sanctioned the use of judicial recess appointments
does not require the political branches to accept the practice as con-
stitutionally correct. The executive and legislative branches appear
to understand that judicial recess appointments pose a substantial
risk to the independence of the judiciary and to the constitutional
rights of litigants. The decisions of the two appellate courts operate
more like advisory opinions: it is constitutional if you want to do it.
The final word on whether it will be done lies exclusively with the
President and the Senate.
113. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., RECESS AP-
POINTMENTS OF FEDERAL JUDGES (Comm. Print 1959). See also Note, Recess Appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court - Constitutional But Unwise?, 10 STAN. L.' REV. 124
(1957).
114. 106 CONG. REc. 18,145 (1960) (emphasis in original).
115. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 964
(1963).
116. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S.
1048 (1986).
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D. Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses
Although the framers did not intend a pure separation of powers,
they added to the Constitution two provisions to keep the executive.
and legislative branches at a certain distance. The Constitution pro-
hibits members of either house from holding any other civil office
(the incompatibility clause)"7 and prohibits members of Congress
from being appointed to any federal position whose salary has been
increased during their term of office (the ineligibility clause).11s The
meaning of these two clauses has been developed almost entirely by
the executive and legislative branches.
The framers included the incompatibility and ineligibility clauses
to prevent the Executive from using the appointment power to cor-
rupt legislators." 9 They knew that the English Crown had used ap-
pointments to undermine the independence of Parliament. 120 The
incompatibility clause has existed for two centuries without any defi-
nition or application by federal courts. When the clause reached a
district court in 1971, in a case involving the right of members of
Congress to hold a commission in the armed forces reserves, the
judge remarked that the "meaning and effect of this constitutional
provision have never before been determined by a court."12 1 Three
years later, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to bring the case.122 In response to the objection that if courts
fail to resolve the issue of the incompatibility clause, as. a practical
matter no one can, the Court replied: "Our system of 'government
leaves many crucial decisions to the political processes."' 2 3 In 1977,
when the Justice Department examined the issue whether members
of Congress may hold commissions as officers in the armed forces
reserves, it concluded that the "exclusive responsibility for interpret-
ing and enforcing the Incompatibility Clause rests with Congress."' 24
With regard to the ineligibility clause, interpretations by Congress
117. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
118. Id.
119. 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 379-82,
386-90; 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 283-84,489-
92.
120. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 835-37 (D.D.C.
1971), qff'd mem, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
121. Id. at 834.
122. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208-209 (1974) (respondents
do not have standing to sue as citizens or taxpayers).
123. Id. at 227.
124. 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 242 (1977).
and the executive branch have far outweighed contributions from the
courts. Opinions by Attorneys General from 1882 to 1895 held that
certain members of Congress were ineligible under the Constitution
to accept appointment to an executive position.125 However, there
were two instances in which the executive branch showed a willing-
ness to reach a settlement with Congress to nominate a member of
Congress who was ineligible under a literal reading of the
Constitution.
President William Howard Taft wanted Senator Philander Knox to
serve as Secretary of State, even though the salary for that office had
been increased during Knox's term. As a way of removing part of
the constitutional problem, legislation passed the Senate to reduce
the compensation of the Secretary of State to the previous level.126
That did not satisfy the literal meaning of the ineligibility clause, but
it appeared to take away the appearance of gain and corruption.
Although the bill passed the Senate without debate and without a re-
corded vote, substantial opposition developed in the House. Con-
gressman Henry D. Clayton reasoned that Taft would nominate
Knox and the Senate would confirm him: "That great body is fully
capable of interpreting any provision of the Constitution."'127 But
Congressman James B. Clark, who would serve as Speaker from 1911
to 1919, strongly objected:
we all know that this bill is an attempt to make a man eligible as Secretary of
State who is ineligible under the Constitution of the United States. [Ap-
plause.] This bill is simply an effort to override the Constitution by statute.
We are asked to stultify ourselves, for that is exactly what it amounts to, for
fear that we will be personae non gratae at the White House. [Applause.] ...
It is a question of the construction of the Constitution. It is a question of un-
derstanding plain English .... 128
Congressman Oscar W. Gillespie agreed, insisting that the provi-
sions of the Constitution in question "are plain, they are emphatic,
they are unequivocal. The salary of the Secretary of State has been
increased."'129 Congressman Edwin Y. Yates reinforced that point:
"Mr. Speaker, it is clear to even a layman as to what the clause in the
Constitution says and means. No technical language is used. No
words of doubtful meanings are there. No ambiguous or uncertain
thought is expressed."130 Nevertheless, the House passed the bill by
the vote of 173 to 116, largely on the ground that the President has a
right to select who he wants for the Cabinet and that the bill satisfied
125. 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 365 (1882); 17 Op. Att'y Gen. 522 (1883); 21 Op. Att'y Gen.
211 (1895).
126. 43 CONG. REc. 2205 (1909).
127. Id. at 2392.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2397.
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the spirit of the ineligibility clause.13 1 The bill was enacted on Feb-
ruary 17, 1909, providing for the repeal of the increase in salary for
the Secretary of State. 3 2
A similar situation occurred in 1973, when President Nixon wanted
to nominate Senator William Saxbe to be Attorney General, even
though the salary for that office had been increased during Saxbe's
term as Senator. The Justice Department concluded that Saxbe
would be eligible if Congress passed legislation setting his salary for
Attorney General at the level established before the increase:
"Neither the public, the Executive branch, nor the Legislative branch
is well-served by a prohibition so broad that it overcorrects and need-
lessly deprives members of Congress of opportunities for public ser-
vice in appointive civil offices."' 3 3 After lengthy debate, the bill
passed the Senate, 75 to 16.134 With less debate, the House passed the
bill 261 to 129 and it became law.l35
The courts have done little to clarify the meaning or boundaries of
the ineligibility clause. Senator Hugo Black was nominated to the
Supreme Court in 1937, although a retirement system for the judici-
ary had been enacted that year while Black served in the Senate.
The Court avoided the constitutional issue by holding that the plain-
tiff lacked standing to bring the suit. 3 6 More recently, the nomina-
tion of Congressman Abner Mikva to the D.C. Circuit was challenged
because the salaries of federal judges had been increased during
Mikva's term in Congress. Once again, the suit was tossed out be-
cause of lack of standing.13 7 The court said that Mikva's opponents
had an opportunity to defeat the nomination, but that Senators on
the losing side could not then ask the judiciary to reverse the Sen-
ate's action.138 The Justice Department had held that Mikva's ap-
pointment to the D.C. Circuit was not barred by the ineligibility
clause, reasoning that the scheduled salary increase had not taken ef-
fect at the time of Mikva's nomination, and that if it had he could be
given the same statutory relief as Senators Knox and Saxbe. 139
131. Id. at 2415.
132. Act of Feb. 17, 1909, ch. 137, 35 stat. 626.
133. 119 CONG. REC. 37,689 (1973) (Statement of Robert G. Dixon, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
134. Id. at 38,315-48.
135. Id. at 39,234-45; Act of Dec. 10, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-178, 87 Stat. 697.
136. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
137. McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981), aff'd sub nom. McClure
v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981).
138. Id. at 270.
139. 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 298 (1979).
E. The Legislative Veto
In the prominent case of INS v. Chadha,14o the Supreme Court
held that "legislative vetoes" are an invalid form of congressional
control over the executive branch.'41 Not only did the Court strike
down the one-house veto in the immigration law being challenged,
but the broad principles announced by the Court nullified all existing
legislative vetoes placed in laws covering such diverse areas as execu-
tive reorganization, rule making, impoundment, foreign trade, and
national emergencies. Justice White noted in his dissent that the
Court. in "one fell swoop" struck down provisions in more laws en-
acted by Congress than the Court had cumulatively invalidated in its
entire history.142
Nevertheless, from the moment of the Chiadha decision on June 23,
1983, to the end of the 101st session, Congress continued to rely on
the legislative veto to control agency actions. Over that period of
time, Congress created approximately two hundred new legislative
vetoes and Presidents Reagan and Bush signed them into law. In-
stead of acting through the full legislative process required by
Chadha (action by both houses and presentment of a bill to the Presi-
dent), these new statutes enable Congress to relyon controls short of
a public law. The usual method is to require committee or subcom-
mittee approval of agency proposals.
What accounts for this gap between what the Court said and what
the two political branches continue to do? Why has there been so lit-
tle compliance with this "epic" decision on separation of powers? Is
it a matter of congressional contempt for the judicial process? I
think a better explanation, is that the Court reached too far and
failed to understand the practical needs that led Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch to adopt the legislative veto in the first place. Those
needs existed before Chadha and they continue after the Court's
decision.
The Court in Chadha stated the obvious: the making of a public
law requires action by both houses of Congress and presentment of a
bill to the President for his signature or veto. 43 But what if a public
law, duly passed by both houses and signed by the President, author-
ized the use of a simple (one-house) or concurrent (two-house) reso-
lution? Would the latter be legally binding and available to control
executive officials? In an opinion in 1854, Attorney General Cushing
concluded that a President, by signing the enabling statute, would in
140. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
141. Id. at 959.
142. Id. at 1002.
143. Id. at 946-47.
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effect consent to the coerciveness of these resolutions.144 Thus, in
1905 Congress passed legislation giving itself the power by concurrent
resolution to direct the Secretary of War to make investigations of
rivers and harbors.145 Congress even resorted to simple resolutions
to direct the Secretary of Commerce to make investigations and to is-
sue reports.14 6
Legislative vetoes expanded in the 1930s as a result of presidential
proposals. In 1929, President Hoover asked Congress to delegate to
him broad authority to reorganize the executive branch, subject to
some form of congressional approval or disapproval. He suggested
that the President be allowed to act "upon approval of a joint com-
mittee of Congress."147 Hoover was willing to swallow the legislative
veto because the regular legislative process for reorganizing govern-
ment contained several uncertainties: congressional inaction or un-
wanted amendments. Hoover received reorganization authority in
1932, subject to a one-house legislative veto.' 48 This accommodation
did not sit well with Attorney General Mitchell, however, who a year
later challenged the constitutionality of the one-house veto.149
In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to renew
the authority to reorganize the executive branch but insisted that any
congressional action short of a bill or joint resolution would merely
represent "an expression of congressional sentiment" without legally
binding effect.150 Members of the House of Representatives'balked
at this request, because disapproval by bill or joint resolution would
mean that Congress would need a two-thirds majority in each house
to override the expected veto. Realizing that Congress would never
grant him reorganization authority without reserving to itself a con-
trol short of a public law, Roosevelt reversed course within a matter
of days and supported an amendment that allowed Congress to reject
his reorganization plans by a concurrent resolution.151 The reorgani-
zation bill passed in 1939, with the two-house veto, and Roosevelt
signed it into law.152 When Congress extended the President's reor-
ganization authority in 1949, it tightened legislative control by resort-
144. 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 680 (1854).
145. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1482, § 2, 33 Stat. 1117, 1147.
146. Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 8, 32 Stat. 825, 829.
147. PUB. PAPERS 1929, at 432.
148. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, §§ 401-08, 47 Stat. 382, 413-15.
149. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 63-64 (1933).
150. 83 CONG. REC. 4487 (1938).
151. Id. at 5003-5004.
152. Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 19, § 5, 53 Stat. 561, 562-63.
ing to a one-house veto.153
Whatever constitutional objections Presidents had about the legis-
lative veto, they acquiesced because they preferred additional author-
ity with the legislative veto over a constitutional fight that might
jeopardize such authority. For example, President Roosevelt signed
the Lend Lease Act in 1941, which permitted Congress to terminate
the President's emergency authority by concurrent resolution. 5 4
Roosevelt withheld his misgivings because he wanted the authority
and feared that publicizing the constitutional issue would delight his
opponents and alienate his friends. 55
The legislative veto continued to spread to other areas. Legislation
in 1940 authorized the Attorney General to suspend deportation of an
alien, subject to a two-house veto (later changed to a one-house
veto).156 This procedure appealed to both Congress and the Presi-
dent, for otherwise they could grant relief to aliens in hardship cases
only through the passage of hundreds of private bills.157 Similarly,
during the emergency conditions of World War II, it was impractica-
ble to expect Congress to authorize each defense installation or pub-
lic works project. Beginning with an informal system in 1942, all
proposals for acquisitions of land and leases were submitted in ad-
vance to the Naval Affairs Committees for their approval. That un-
derstanding was formalized in a public law in 1944, requiring the
Secretary of the Navy to "come into agreement" with the Naval Af-
fairs Committees with respect to the terms of prospective acquisitions
or disposals of land.158 Congress enacted other coming-into-agree-
ment provisions in 1949 and 1951, requiring the Armed Services Com-
mittees to approve the acquisition of land and real estate
transactions. 5 9
President Truman objected to the use of committee vetoes in a veto
message in 1952, questioning the "propriety and wisdom of giving
Committees veto power over executive functions authorized by the
Congress to be carried out by executive agencies."' 60 In an effort to
stop the proliferation of committee vetoes, Attorney General Brown-
ell issued an opinion in 1955 that characterized the legislative veto as
153. Reorganization Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 109, § 202, 63 Stat. 203, 207.
154. Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 11, § 3, 55 Stat. 31, 32.
155. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1353, 1356-57 (1953).
156. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 670, § 20(c) 54 Stat. 670, 672 (1940). Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 244(b), 66 Stat. 162, 216 (1952).
157. Mansfield, The Legislative Veto and the Deportation of Aliens, 1 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 281 (1941).
158. Act of Apr. 4, 1944, Pub. L. No. 289, § 1, 58 Stat. 189, 190.
159. Act of May 11, 1949, Pub. L. No. 60, § 2, 63 Stat. 66, 66; Act of Sept. 28, 1951,
Pub. L. No. 155, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365.
160. PUB. PAPERS, 1952, at 488.
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an unconstitutional infringement on executive duties.161 Congress,
however, was equal to the challenge. It could easily create substi-
tutes that gave committees the same level of control without raising
constitutional issues. Legislation was drafted to prohibit appropria-
tions for certain real estate transactions unless the Public Works
Committees first approved the contracts.162 The "committee veto"
thus operated within the halls of Congress rather than against execu-
tive agencies. Eisenhower signed the bill after Brownell assured him
that this new procedure was constitutional because it was based on
the power of Congress to control its authorization and appropriation
procedures.163 The form changed; the substance of the committee
veto remained in force.
Executive-legislative relations experienced new strains in the 1970s
when Congress decided to extend the legislative veto to such areas as
the war power, national emergencies, impoundment, presidential pa-
pers, federal salaries, and selected agency regulations. By the late
1970s, Congress even considered applying the legislative veto to con-
trol regulations issued by every agency of government.
Although the Carter administration agreed to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the legislative veto, it conceded ground on several
fronts. An opinion by Attorney General Bell in 1977 attempted to
undermine the legality of legislative vetoes while at the same time
defending the one-house veto in the reorganization statute.164 This
strained analysis made it clear that the administration would carve
out whatever exceptions were necessary to secure authority the Pres-
ident wanted. The following year, President Carter released a
strong critique of the legislative veto. He warned that the legislative
vetoes already enacted into law would be treated merely as "report-
and-wait" provisions. 16 5 Any congressional disapproval by committee
action, simple resolution, or concurrent resolution would be given
"serious consideration" by executive officials but would not be re-
garded as legally binding.'66 Despite the confrontation and hard line
taken in the President's message, administration officials were will-
ing to yield in selected areas for the sake of comity between the exec-
utive and legislative branches.
161. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 230, 231 (1955).
162. J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 230-31 (1964).
163. Id.
164. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 10 (1977).
165. PUB. PAPERS, 1978 (I), at 1149.
166. Id.
For example, on the same day that Carter issued his statement, At-
torney General Bell and White House aide Stuart Eizenstat
backpedaled from Carter's broad threat. When a reporter asked
whether the administration would have felt itself legally bound if
Congress passed, pursuant to the statutory procedure, a concurrent
resolution disapproving an arms sale to the Mideast, Bell replied:
He would not be bound in our view, but we have to have comity between the
branches of government, just as we have between nations. And under a spirit
of comity, we could abide by it, and there would be nothing wrong with abid-
ing by it. We don't have to have a confrontation every time we can.
1 6 7
Eizenstat added:
I think the point the Judge is making is that we don't concede the constitu-
tionality of any of them yet, but that as a matter of comity with certain of
these issues where we think the Congress has a legitimate interest, such as
the War Powers Act, as a matter of comity, we are willing to forego the spe-
cific legal challenge and abide by that judgment because we think it is such an
overriding issue.
1 6 8
The Carter and Reagan administrations supported a legal test on
the constitutionality of the legislative vetoes, resulting in notable vic-
tories in an immigration case in the Ninth Circuit 169 and two rule
making cases in the D.C. Circuit. 170 The latter two decisions were so
broad that they threatened to invalidate every type of legislative
veto. After the D.C. Circuit in another case held a committee veto
unconstitutional, Judges Patricia Wald and Abner Mikva supported a
motion for a rehearing en banc
because vitally important issues of executive-legislative relations are articu-
lated too broadly and explored inadequately in the panel opinion. We are es-
pecially concerned that the panel's opinion lumps together for automatic
rejection under the rubric of "legislative vetoes" several different kinds of
statutory provisions, each entailing a' distinct accommodation between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches. Such black-and-white treatment of these
statutes ignores a largely gray area that has existed for 200 years in our consti-
tutional scheme. 17
1
Judge Wald, having served as a top official in the Justice Depart-
ment, and Judge Mikva, a former member of Congress, were both
sensitive to the politically 'complex relations between the branches,
relations not easily compartmentalized into judicially constructed cat-
167. Office of the White House Press Secretary, Briefing by Attorney General Grif-
fin B. Bell, Stuart Eizenstat, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Pol-
icy, and John Harmon, Office of Legal Counsel 9 (June 21, 1978) (available in the
office of the Pepperdine Law Review).
168. Id.
169. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980) off'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
170. Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en
banc), aff'd sub nom Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of
Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575
(D.C. Cir. 1982) off'd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer En-
ergy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).
171. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
[Vol. 18: 57, 1990] Int retation Outside The Courts
PEPPERDINE LAW PEIEW
egories. They feared that the broad language adopted by the D.C.
Circuit would "foreclose careful consideration of... historical experi-
ence, practical working relationships, and the deference due Congress
when it established its own procedures under the Constitution." 7 2
Also in 1982, I published an article entitled "Congress Can't Lose
On Its Veto Power."173 The article predicted that if the courts in-
sisted on taking from Congress its legislative veto, "no one should un-
derestimate its ingenuity in inventing other devices that will be more
cumbersome for the president and just as satisfactory to Con-
gress."17 4 With or without the legislative veto, Congress would re-
main "knee-deep in administrative decisions, and it is inconceivable
that any court or any president can prevent this. Call it supervision,
intervention, or plain meddling, Congress will find a way."' 75
When the Supreme Court decided Chadha in 1983, it followed the
same broad principles used by the D.C. Circuit. Any action of Con-
gress that had the effect of "altering the legal rights, duties, and rela-
tions" of persons outside the legislative branch must conform to two
procedural requirements: action by both houses (to satisfy bicamera-
lism) and presentment of a bill or joint resolution to the President
for his signature or veto.176
Following the Court's ruling, Congress amended a number of stat-
utes by deleting legislative vetoes and replacing them with joint reso-
lutions. The statutes changed to comply with Chadha include the
D.C. Home Rule Act, executive reorganization, national emergencies,
export administration, and federal pay.177 In the case of executive
reorganization, the President was actually worse off than before. In-
stead of relying on the one-house veto, Congress inserted a joint reso-
lution of approval. That satisfied the two requirements of Chadha -
bicameralism and presentment - but the President now had to ob-
tain the approval of both houses within a fixed number of days. In
172. Id.
173. Fisher, Congress Can't Lose on Its Veto Power, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1982, at D1.
174. Id. at D5.
175. Id.
176. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
177. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation (D.C.
Home Rule) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 131, 98 stat. 1945, 1974 (1984); Reorganization
Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, § 3, 98 Stat. 3192, 3193 (executive organi-
zation); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No.
99-93, § 801, 99 Stat. 448, 448 (1985) (national emergencies); Export Administration
Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 301(b), 99 Stat. 120, 160 (1985) (export
administration); Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, § 135(e), 99 Stat. 1185, 1322
(federal pay).
effect, Congress had a negative one-house veto. The refusal of one
House to approve spelled defeat for a reorganization plan.
Congress continued to put legislative vetoes in bills and Presidents
continued to sign them into law. From the date of the Court's deci-
sion in (Zlzadha to the end of the 101st Congress, Congress enacted ap-
proximately two hundred new legislative vetoes. Most of these
require the executive branch to obtain the approval of specified com-
mittees. Congress no longer attempts to use one-house or two-house
resolutions to control agency actions. The effect of COadha had been
to drive legislative vetoes underground, operating at the committee
and subcommittee level.
Even if Congress complied fully with Chadha by removing these
committee vetoes from public laws, some form of committee control
would continue. For example, a conflict arose in 1984 when Presi-
dent Reagan signed an appropriations bill for the Department of
Housing and Urban Development and independent agencies.17s He
objected to the presence of several provisions that required executive
agencies to seek the prior approval of the Appropriations Commit-
tees.179 His signing statement implied that the committee-veto provi-
sions would be regarded by the administration as legally
nonbinding.So After notifying the committees, agencies could do as
they liked without obtaining the committees' approval.' 8 '
The House Appropriations Committee responded quickly to this
challenge. It reviewed a procedure that had worked well with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration for about four years.
Statutory ceilings ("caps") were placed on various NASA programs,
usually at the level requested in the President's budget. NASA could
exceed those caps only if it received permission from the Appropria-
tions Committees. Because the administration now threatened to ig-
nore the committee controls, the House Appropriations Committee
said that it would repeal both the committee veto and NASA's au-
thority to exceed the caps. If NASA wanted to spend beyond the
caps, it would have to do what the Court mandated in Chadha: pass a
bill through both houses and present it to the President. 8 2
Because of the dispute between the President and Congress, NASA
was about to lose precious flexibility. It did not want to seek new
public laws to make mid-year adjustments. To avoid that kind of ad-
ministrative rigidity, NASA Administrator James M. Beggs wrote to
the Appropriations Committees and suggested a compromise. Instead
of putting the caps in a public law, he recommended that they be




182. H.R. REP. No. 916, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1984).
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placed in the conference report accompanying the bill.183 He then
pledged that NASA would not exceed any ceiling identified in the
conference report without first obtaining the prior approval of the
Appropriations Committees. 8 4 What had been done directly by stat-
ute would now be done indirectly by informal agreements. Chadha
does not affect these nonstatutory legislative vetoes.
A similar dispute erupted in 1987. The Director of the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB"), James C. Miller, III, objected to a
statutory provision that required the administration to obtain "writ-
ten prior approval" from the Appropriations Committees before
transferring foreign assistance funds from one account to another.'
8 5
The provision, he said, violated Chadha. The House Appropriations
Committee advised him that Congress would repeal the committee
veto and, at the same time, repeal the transfer authority.'8 6 Realiz-
ing that the dispute had veered in a perilous direction for the execu-
tive branch, OMB backed down and the committee veto remained in
the bill.187
When Miller again challenged the provision the next year, Con-
gress followed through on its threat and deleted both the committee
veto and the transfer authority. The two branches reached a compro-
mise in 1989 when Congress removed the legislative veto from the
public law, but required the administration to follow "the regular no-
tification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations" before
transferring funds.188 While not spelled out in the public law, those
procedures require the administration to notify the Committees of
each transfer. If no objection is raised during a 15-day review period,
the administration may exercise its authority. If the Committees ob-
ject, however, the administration proceeds at peril. By ignoring com-
mittee objections, the executive branch will most likely lose its
transfer authority.
A third example of an informal legislative veto developed in 1989
183. Letter from James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees (Aug. 9, 1984) (available at the office of the Pepperdine
Law Review).
-184. Latter from James M. Beggs, NASA Administrator, to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees (Aug. 9, 1984) (available in Pepperdine Law School
Library).
185. OMB Objection Raises House Panel's Hackles: Administration May Lose For-
eign-Aid Option, Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1987, at D1.
186. Id.
187. Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 514, 101 Stat. 1329-155.
188. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 514, 103 Stat. 1219.
during the early months of the Bush administration. Secretary of
State James A. Baker, III, decided to give four committees of Con-
gress a veto power over the fractious issue of funding the Nicaraguan
contras. In return for receiving $50 million for humanitarian aid to
the contras, he agreed that a portion of the funds could be released
only with the approval of the two Appropriations Committees, the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committees, as well as key party leaders. White House counsel C.
Boyden Gray objected to this level of involvement by Congress in for-
eign policy, especially through what appeared to be a legislative
veto. 8 9 Former federal judge Robert H. Bork regarded the Baker
Accord as "even more objectionable" than the legislative veto struck
down in Chadha because it permitted control by committee action, or
inaction, instead of the one-house veto. 190 However, Baker entered
into the "side agreement" with Congress on the ground that it was
informal and nonstatutory and, therefore, not covered by COadha.191
Four members of the House of Representatives challenged the Baker
Accord as unconstitutional, but their suit was dismissed by a federal
district court.192
There is nothing unconstitutional about informal, nonstatutory
controls. Under our system of separation of powers, they are often
necessary techniques for making government function more effec-
tively. Executive agencies may decide that it is in their best interest
to defer to the wishes of congressional committees. As a federal ap-
pellate court noted in 1984 after rejecting a challenge that a commit-
tee-review procedure constituted a forbidden legislative veto,
committee chairmen and members of Congress "naturally develop in-
terest and expertise in the subjects entrusted to their continuing sur-
veillance."193 Executive officials take these committeess "into
account and keep them informed, respond to their inquiries, and, it
may be, flatter and please them when neccessary."' 19 4 Because of
these informal associations, committees develop "enormous influ-
ence" over executive branch activities.195 The appeals court found
nothing unconstitutional about these relations: "indeed, our separa-
tion of powers makes such informal cooperation much more neces-
sary than it would be in a pure system of parliamentary
189. Bush Counsel Contests Contra Aid Plan, Gray Feels Pact with Congress May
Infringe on Presidential Power, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1989, at A5.
190. 135 CONG. REC. 3885 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Helms).
191. Letter from Secretary of State Baker to House Speaker Jim Wright (Apr. 28,
1989) (available in Pepperdine Law School Library).
192. Burton v. Baker, 723 F. Supp. 1550 (D.D.C. 1989).
193. City of Alexandria v. United States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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government."'9
To minimize the risk of self-inflicted wounds, the Supreme Court
usually follows the sensible guideline in Ashwander v. TVA'I7 that
the Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."'198
The Court failed to follow that policy in Chadha by issuing a decision
that not only reached beyond the necessities of the case but exceeded
the Court's understanding of executive-legislative relations. Through
an endless variety of formal and informal agreements, congressional
committees will continue to exercise control over administration
decisions.
F. War Power and Covert Operations
The Court cautioned in 1962 that "it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judi-
cial cognizance.'1 99 There are indeed foreign policy disputes that are
adjudicated in the courts. When a President enters into an executive
agreement that conflicts with a statute passed by Congress pursuant
to its constitutional power over foreign commerce, the courts have
declared the executive agreement invalid.200 The courts have invali-
dated other executive agreements because they violate the just com-
pensation clause201 or deprive an accused of trial by jury.202
President Truman's seizure of steel mills in 1952, in order to prose-
cute the war in Korea, was struck down by the Court.203 The effort
by the Nixon administration to invoke "national security" to enjoin
newspapers from publishing the Pentagon Papers found no support
in the courts.2O4 Similarly, the theory by the Nixon administration
196. Id.
197. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
198. Id. at 347 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Liverpool v. Emigration Comm'rs,
113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)).
199. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
200. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.j 204 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1953) ("It is
clear that the executive may not through entering into such an agreement avoid com-
plying with regulation prescribed by Congress.") off'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296
(1955).
201. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 606 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ("[W]e think that
there can be no doubt that an executive agreement .. .cannot impair Constitutional
Rights.").
202. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) ("[N]o agreement with a foreign nation
can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is
free from the restraints of the Constitution.").
203. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
204. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
that it possessed constitutional power to make warrantless national
security surveillances of domestic organizations was rejected by the
Court.20 5
These are unusual decisions for the Court. Questions of the per-
missible scope of the war power or covert operations are left almost
exclusively to Congress and the President. The War Powers Resolu-
tion of 1973206 represents an effort by the two branches to establish
broad principles to promote the "collective judgment" of both
branches. The President is granted discretion to dispatch U.S. troops
into hostilities or imminent hostilities for short periods (60 to 90
days), while congressional authorization is required for longer
periods.
20 7
Members of Congress have gone to court to contest military initia-
tives by the President, but those efforts are regularly turned aside by
federal judges on the ground that the determination of what consti-
tutes hostilities or imminent hostilities is essentially a fact-finding
matter reserved to Congress, not the courts.2 08 Courts are leery in
adjudicating disputes when one group of members of Congress claim
that the President has violated the War Powers Resolution while an-
other group of members of Congress claim that he has not.20 9 Fed-
eral judges are apt to see this type of case as an intramural dispute
that should be resolved entirely within the halls of Congress. The
message to Congress is quite clear: "If Congress doubts or disagrees
with the Executive's determination that U.S. forces in El Salvador
have not been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, it
has the resources to investigate the matter and assert its wishes." 2 10
To present a case appropriate for judicial resolution, Congress would
have to invoke its constitutional powers and the President would
have to disregard them, thereby creating a constitutional impasse
ripe for the courts.2 11 Otherwise, the dispute is nonjusticiable and re-
mains solely within the political arena.
205. United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S.
297, 321 (1972) ("[Wle conclude that the government's concerns do not justify depar-
ture in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment requirement of judicial ap-
proval prior to initiation of a search of surveillance.").
206. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (current version
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-8 (1978)).
207. L. FISHER, War Powers. The Need for Collective Judgment, in DIVIDED DEMOC-
RAcy (J. Thurber ed. 1990).
208. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).
209. Id. at 894-95 (twenty-nine members of the House of Representatives claimed
that President Reagan violated the War Powers Resolution by supplying military
equipment and aid to the government of El Salvador, while sixteen Senators and
twelve Representatives said that no violation occurred).
210. Id. at 899.
211. Id.
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The same result occurred when members of Congress contested
President Reagan's actions in Nicaragua, Grenada, and the Persian
Gulf. In the Nicaragua case, a federal judge concluded that "the cov-
ert activities of CIA operatives in Nicaragua and Honduras are per-
force even less judicially discoverable than the level of participation
by U.S. military personnel in hostilities in El Salvador." 212 Courts re-
fuse to adjudicate such disputes because of "the. impossibility of our
undertaking independent resolution without expressing a lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government." 213 When litigants
sue for damage remedies claiming that presidential military actions
violate the rights of foreign citizens, courts take the position that
"the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the crea-
tion of damage remedies against military and foreign policy officials
for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects causing
injury abroad."214
After President Reagan used military force against Grenada,
eleven members of Congress brought an action in federal court con-
tending that the invasion was unconstitutional. A district judge gave
this response: "Certainly when plaintiff legislators can avail them-
selves of institutional remedies that are afforded to Congress, the
Court, under its broad equitable powers, should decline to exercise its
jurisdiction."215 Similarly, Pesident Reagan's use of military force in
the Persian Gulf triggered a legal challenge by members of Congress,
who petitioned a federal district court to declare that Reagan was re-
quired by the War Powers Resolution to file specific reports on the
use of U.S. armed forces in that region.216 The court refused to de-
cide whether the President was required to submit specific reports
under the War Powers Resolution, concluding "that the exercise of
federal jurisdiction in these circumstances would be both inappropri-
ate and imprudent."217
Congress and the President have spent the past decade searching
212. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
213. Id. at 600. The court referred to the differing views held by President Reagan
and members of Congress stating it was "up to Congress and the President to try to
resolve their differences." Id.
214. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 209.
215. Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324, 326 (D.D.C. 1984), dismissed as moot, 765
F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the end of the Grenada invasion made moot the claim for
injunctive relief).
216. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
217. Id. at 337. The court dismissed the case based on "prudential considerations"
and the political question doctrine. Id. The court declined to render an opinion that
for reasonable reporting requirements for covert operations. The In-
telligence Oversight Act of 1980218 required the Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of all other agencies involved in intelli-
gence activities to keep the House and Senate Intelligence Commit-
tees "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities.2 19
The statute also authorized the President, in "extraordinary circum-
stances affecting vital interests of the United States," to notify only
eight members of Congress: the chairman and ranking minority
members of the Intelligence Committees, the Speaker and minority
leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate.220 If notice was not given to Congress, or these eight mem-
bers, the President was required to "fully inform" the Intelligence
Committees "in a timely fashion" and to explain the failure to pro-
vide notice.221
This procedure worked fairly well over the years and accommo-
dated the constitutional prerogatives of each, branch. However, the
Reagan administration sold arms to Iran and failed to notify Con-
gress at all. Congress learned of the sale ten months later, after the
story leaked in a November 1986 Beirut magazine.22 2 In November
1987, the House and Senate Iran-Contra Committees proposed an
amendment to the 1980 statute requiring that "Congress be notified
prior to the commencement of a covert action except in certain rare
instances and in no event later than 48 hours after a presidential
Finding is approved." 223
Legislation was introduced to eliminate such 'vague phrases as
"timely fashion" and to adopt, as a substitute, the specific require-
ment that the President notify Congress of a covert operation no
later than 48 hours after its initiation.224 The administration testified
against the bill, claiming that the 48-hour requirement "could seri-
ously impair the President's ability to discharge his important consti-
tutional responsibilities in the field of foreign relations."2 25 Although
the administration agreed that it was important to work coopera-
tively with Congress on covert operations, it stated that
would impose a consensus on Congress, but did not preclude judicial review of the con-
stitutionality of the War Powers Resolution in other circumstances. Id. at 339.
218. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501, 94 Stat. 1981-82 (codified at 15




222. IRAN-CoNTA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433 and S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 163-262, 561 (1987).
223. Id. at 423.
224. H.R. 3822, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
225. Oversight Legislation, 1987: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intel-
ligence, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1987) (testimony of Charles J. Cooper, Assistant At-
torney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
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there may be instances where the President must be able to initiate, direct,
and control extremely sensitive national security activities. We believe this
presidential authority is protected by the Constitution, and that by purporting
to oblige the President, under any and all circumstances, to notify Congress
of a covert action within a fixed period of time, S. 1721 infringes on this con-
stitutional prerogative of the President. 2
The Senate Intelligence Committee disagreed with that assessment
and reported legislation in 1988 that incorporated the 48-hour
limit.227 The Committee did not agree that a statutory requirement
to notify Congress of covert actions would frustrate the President's
ability to discharge his constitutional duties.228 The Committee re-
jected the theory that covert actions represent "an area of independ-
ent or exclusive presidential power under the Constitution."2 29
Although the Committee conceded that the President might have
sole responsibility for carrying out covert actions, they also reiterated
that Congress was responsible for appropriating money for such ac-
tions.230 The Senate passed the bill by the comfortable margin of 71-
19.231
The bill failed to move forward on the House side. After President
Bush was elected, there was renewed pressure for some kind of ac-
commodation between the two branches. The Senate Intelligence
Committee persisted with its 48-hour rule; no such provision ap-
peared in House legislation.2 32 Finally, the Senate committee
dropped the 48-hour requirement in return for a pledge by President
Bush that in "almost all instances" he would notify the Intelligence
Committee in advance of a covert action, with the understanding that
in "rare instances" he might delay notification a "few days."2 3 3 Any
withholding beyond that period would be based on the President's as-
sertion of authorities granted by the Constitution.23 4 An effort by
Congress to further clarify reporting requirements by adopting new
statutory language failed when President Bush vetoed the bill.235
226. Id. at 90. (emphasis in original).
227. S. REP. No. 276, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988).
228. Id. at 20 ("Indeed, refusal to communicate such information to the Congress
affectively precludes it from discharging its own duties under the Constitution.").
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 134 CONG. REC. S2249 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1988).
232. Impasse Over Intelligence Legislation, Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1989, at A4.
233. Panel Drops Covert-Acts Notification, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1989, at Al.
234. Letter from President George Bush to Senator David L. Boren (Oct. 30, 1989)
(available at the office of the Pepperdine Law Review). See Panel Drops Covert-Acts
Notification, supra note 229, at Al.
235. 26 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 1958 (Nov. 30, 1990).
IV. CONCLUSION
These examples merely illustrate the degree to which the meaning
of the Constitution depends on nonjudicial interpretations by the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches. Other examples come readily to
mind. The President's power to exercise executive privilege and
thereby withhold documents and information from Congress is rarely
litigated. The Watergate Tapes Case 23 6 is the leading example, but it
raises more constitutional questions than it resolves.23 7 Collisions be-
tween Congress and the President over access to executive branch in-
formation are typically handled through political means, not
litigation. If Congress wants information and the President refuses
to yield, generally it is sufficient for Congress to bring out its big
guns - subpoenas and the power to hold executive officials in con-
tempt - to satisfy legislative needs.238
The President's power to "reinterpret" the ABM treaty provoked a
major constitutional battle during the Reagan years, but the dispute
was resolved solely through political confrontations and accommoda-
tions.239 Secret spending by the Intelligence Community calls into
question the application of the statement and account clause,24o but
in 1974 the Court declined an opportunity to decide the meaning of
this constitutional provision.241 In a dissent, Justice Douglas ex-
pressed surprise that the Court would refuse to adjudicate the case
and toss it back to the political branches: "Congress of course has dis-
cretion; but to say that it has the power to read the clause out of the
Constitution when it comes to one or two or three agencies is as-
tounding."2 42 As a result, the meaning of the statement and account
236. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
237. See, e.g., Henkin, Executive Privilege. Mr. Nixon Loses But the Presidency
Largely Prevails, 22 UCLA L. REV. 40 (1974).
238. L. FISHER, supra note 17, at 208-13.
239. See, e.g., Koplow, Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation
of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353, 1366-75 (1989). This edition is fo-
cused on "Arms Control Treaty Reinterpretation." Other commentaries of interest in-
clude: Sofaer, Treaty Interpretatiom A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1437; (1989)
Rostow, The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1451
(1989); Trimble, The Constitutional Common Law of Treaty Interpretation: A Reply to
the Formalists, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Block Casey & Rivkin, The Senates Pie-
in- the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1481 (1989); Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1511 (1989); Nunn, A Common-Sense Definition of "Common Un-
derstanding?," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1523; Biden & Ritch, The Treaty Power: Upholding a
Constitutional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1989).
240. In pertinent part the statement and account clause reads: "[A] regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be pub-
lished from time to time." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
241. In United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), the Court found the tax-
payer had only "generalized grievances" and lacked standing to challenge the CIA's
reporting procedures. Id. at 175.
242. Id. at 200-01.
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clause depends on whatever the executive and legislative branches
decide.243
Many of the major separation of powers disputes are resolved
nonjudicially through tradeoffs and compromises reached by the
President and Congress, which is true also for many other constitu-
tional issues.2 " The rough and tumble character of political debate
lacks some of the amenities and dignity of the judicial process, but
executive officials and legislators are well-informed and generally
take their responsibilities seriously. It is important to recognize their
contributions and understand separation of powers in a larger con-
text than caselaw.
243. L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 203-23 (1975).
244. L. FISHE, CONSTITUTIONAL DLuoGuEs 231-79 (1988).

